Date and Time: 14:30 – 18:15 on June 2nd, 2018
Venue: Conference Room (Roon no. 107) at 1st Floor of East Building →Middle-sized Meeting Room (No. 332), 3rd Floor, Inamori Foundation Building, CSEAS, Kyoto University
Program:
14:30 – 15:30: Case of Indonesia (Moderator: Kiba Saya)
Honna Jun (Ritsumeikan University)
The War on Drugs and Intra-Police Dynamics in Indonesia
Okamoto Masaaki (Kyoto University)
The (Re-) Rise of Military-backed Private Security Providers in Indonesia
15:30-15:45: Q&A Session
15:45-16:00: Coffee Break
16:00-17:00: Case of Thailand and Myanmar (Moderator: Okamoto Masaaki)
Puangthong Pawakapan (Chulalongkorn University and Kyoto University)
Thailand’s Development Military from Counter-Insurgency to Counter-Democracy
Adhi Priamarizki (Ritsumeikan University)
Changing Role of Pro-Government Militias in Myanmar: From Ka Kwe Ye to Border Guard Force
17:00-17:40: Comments and Responses
Thongchai Winichakul (Jetro-IDE)
17:40-18:15: General Discussion
Abstracts:
The War on Drugs and Intra-Police Dynamics in Indonesia
Honna Jun (Ritsumeikan University)
Since 2015, Indonesia has engaged in the war on drugs. The war has resulted in the arrests of more than 150,000 drug dealers and buyers, the extrajudicial killings of 90 people, and the executions of more than 70 convicts in two years. These punitive approaches are strongly criticized by civil society organizations and human rights defenders who believe that the drug war never solves the problem. However, we have seen the escalation of the war until today. Why is that? Indonesia watchers tend to find the answer in Jokowi’s political leadership. They argue that the war has been extended because the president wants to build his public image as a strong leader who is firm against crimes; an image that is expected to wipe out his original image as a soft and ordinary man. This rebuilding of image is alleged to be important in preparing his re-election in 2019. However, these views hardly help us understand the incentives of agencies that have engaged in the drug war, namely the national police and the national narcotic agency (BNN). I will discuss how intra-police dynamics have incentivized the escalation of the war and how this is more important than the Jokowi factor in understanding today’s war on drugs in Indonesia.
The (Re-) Rise of Military-backed Private Security Providers in Indonesia
Okamoto Masaaki (Kyoto University)
The Indonesian state has never had an idea to monopolize the coercive force. The Indonesian state has always tried to coopt and utilize private security providers to its own benefit. That has not changed under the current democratic regime. When the 32 years’ authoritarian regime was over in the late 1990s, different types of vigilante groups and militias mushroomed in different parts of Indonesia and the state had difficulties to deal with them. With the refurbishment of state power different from the Suharto regime, the current Indonesian state has started a new cooption project toward private security providers with the start of state defense program. The paper wants to analyze the evolving pattern of state and private security provider relationship with a comparative perspective.
Thailand’s Development Military from Counter-Insurgency to Counter-Democracy
Puangthong Pawakapan (Chulalongkorn University and Kyoto University)
Development program was an important part of the Thai military’s civil affairs projects with an aim to win the people war during the counter-insurgency period. The Thai military has often proudly presented itself as the trusted and active assistant to the royal development projects. It adopted the term “thahan nakphatthana” (development military) to describe its non-combatant but constructive activities to the society. However, its development program has continued to expand into the new areas, particularly since the 2006 coup, which toppled the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. Puangthong argues that the military’s development program in the time of polarized politics disguises the military’s attempt to entrench its control over majoritarian politics.
Changing Role of Pro-Government Militias in Myanmar: From Ka Kwe Ye to Border Guard Force
Adhi Priamarizki (Ritsumeikan University)
Militia has been playing a crucial role in supporting the Tatmadaw in doing its duty, particularly domestic security role. Burmese authority formed the Ka Kwe Ye (KKY) in the 1960s to combat the ethnic insurgents and later the communist rebels in the country. In 2009, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) of Myanmar formulated the Border Guard Force (BGF) programme to include formally former ethnic insurgents into Tatmadaw‘s structure. Study on militia in Myanmar is mainly still underdeveloped, though previous discussion on the internal armed conflicts in the country occasionally included a brief discussion on the role of the militia in the brawls. The use of militia in Myanmar is not only monopolized by the authority, as it is also done by the ethnic rebels. This study analyses the pro-government militias (PGMs) of Myanmar by looking at the period after the demise of SPDC to provide a more focused discussion on the subject. I elaborate the changing role of PGMs in Myanmar, particularly its contribution in sustaining the Tatmadaw‘s domination in the country. I also discuss the relationship between the existence of pro-Tatmadaw militia with persistence implementation of military domestic security role. Understanding this would be crucial to identify possible sources of the Tatmadaw‘s political power in the country.